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RECENT DECISIONS
ANTITRUST - CLAYTON ACT - SECTION 7 RESTRICTIONS HELD
APPLICABLE To JOINT VENTURES.-In 1957 Olin Mathieson Chem-
ical Corporation and Pennsalt Chemicals Corporation executed a
sales agreement whereby Pennsalt would produce sodium chlorate
and Olin would serve as its exclusive selling agent. In 1960 these
two corporations extended their relationship by forming a joint
venture,' Penn-Olin Chemical Company, for the production of
sodium chlorate in the southeastern United States. As a result
of this combination, Penn-Olin's share of the market in 1962 rose
from Pennsalt's original 8.9 per cent to 27.6 per cent. The
United States brought an action to dissolve the joint venture,
claiming that the combination was violative of Section 7 of the
Clayton Act.2 In this case of first impression a divided Supreme
Court vacated the district court's judgment for the defendant s
and held the restrictions of Section 7 of the Clayton Act applicable
to joint -entures. United States v. Penn-Olin Chein. Co., 378
U.S. 158 (1964).
The joint venture has been used in the past as an effective
method by which two or more individuals or corporations could
combine their assets in order to achieve a common goal. "[T]he
joint venture originated as a commercial or maritime enter-
prise used for trading purposes." 4 Thus it was used by the
Hanseatic League and the Dutch for overseas trade and colon-
ization.5
± "Joint venture is an association of two or more natural or juridical
persons to carry on as co-owners an enterprise . . . for the duration of that
particular transaction or series of transactions or for a limited time."
Taubman, What Constitutes A Joint Venture, 41 CORNELL L.Q. 640, 641
(1956).2 Section 7 provides: "No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire,
directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share
capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another
corporation engaged also in comtnnerce, where in any line of commerce in
any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially
to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." 64 Stat. 1125 (1950),
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958), amending 38 Stat. 731 (1914). (Emphasis added.)
3United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 217 F. Supp. 110 (D. Del.
1963).4 jaeger, Joint Ventures: Origin, Nature and Development, 9 Am. U.L.
Rlv. 1, 2 (1960).
s Ibid. The joint venture has been used, more recently, in the discovery
and development of fissionable materials, the exploitation of oil and other
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Throughout this time the joint venture had possessed an identi-
fiable economic character. However, it was not until the latter
half of the nineteenth century that the courts began to "clothe thejoint venture with certain [legal] attributes." 6 And "it was not
until the decision in Ross v. Willett7 that the courts began to refer
unequivocally to a joint adventure as a legal relationship. But the
development since that case has been phenomenal.""8
The joint venture is legally and economically similar to a
partnership9 and has been said to have the form of a quasi-merger 10
Since it has proven peculiarly adaptable to the increasingly complex
enterprise of the space age,1" it has been used widely by United
States industry in "an effort to distribute the risk, maximize the
use of investment capital and divide heavy costs of construction
and operation .... ,12  Because of these basic attributes, and since
joint ventures had not been considered violative of the restrictions
of the Clayton Act, they were often used in preference to other
more strictly controlled forms of business combination.
In 1914 the Government's antitrust jurisdiction was extended
by the passage of the Clayton Act.' 3 In the original act, section 7
prohibited the acquisition of the stock of one company by another
"engaged in commerce."' 4  It soon became clear that since this
section did not proscribe the acquisition of the assets of one com-
pany by another, mergers effected by such a combination would
be exempt from Clayton Act restrictions. In 1950 this loophole
was eliminated by the Celler-Kefauver Amendment 5 which broad-
ened the scope of federal antitrust jurisdiction. It authorizes the
Government to enjoin the acquisition of the assets of one company
engaged in commerce by another engaged in that same line of com-
merce if such acquisition might "substantially . . . lessen competition
or ... tend to create a monopoly." 16 By reducing the opportunity
to create monopolies, the restrictions of the Clayton Act were in-
mineral resources, and the construction and operation of power reactors.
Id. at 1. For a further description of the uses to which joint ventures
have been put, see Jaeger, Joint Ventures: Membership, Types and Termi-
nation, 9 AM. U.L. REv. 111, 117-27 (1960).
6 Jaeger, supra note 4.
776 Hun 211, 27 N.Y. Supp. 785 (App. Div. 1894).
a State v. Stokke, 65 S.D. 207, 213, 272 N.W. 811, 818 (1937).
9 Jaeger, supra note 4, at 2-3.
10oKAYsm & Tupwm, ANTrTUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL
ANALYSIS 136-41 (1959).
11 Jaeger, supra note 4, at 1.
12 Broden & Scanlan, The Legal Status of Joint Venture Corporations,
11 VAND. L. Rzv. 673, 674 (1958).
1'38 Stat. 730 (1914).
"4The type of restriction imposed by section 7 was not new; its generic
equivalent existed long before the Industrial Revolution. VAN Cs, UNDER-
STANDING Tnn ANTTRuST LAWS 3-5 (1963).
'564 Stat. 1125 (1950).
26.Ibid.
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tended to preserve and promote competition. 17  This differs from
the approach taken by other antitrust legislation, since it was de-
signed to preclude any anti-competitive practices from arising, rather
than to eliminate any already existing practices.' 8 Thus, the act
tends to stifle those forms of business combination which might
possibly discourage competition.
The amended act was intended to have "broad application to
acquisitions that are economically significant."'19 Although it was
clear that "the purpose of the . . . bill . . . is to limit future
increases in the level of economic concentration resulting from
corporate mergers and acquisitions," 20 concentrations effected by a
joint venture arrangement were not considered violative of section 7.
The wording of the statute itself was responsible for this new
loophole. Section 7 requires that both the acquiring and acquired
corporations be "engaged in commerce" at the time of acquisition.
It was reasoned that there could be no foreclosure of competition
unless these two parties were competitors.2 ' The 1950 amendment,
however, seems to make explicit that the competition foreclosed
need not have been between the acquired and the acquiring. By
deleting the requirement that competition be substantially lessened
"between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the cor-
poration making the acquisition"2 2 the Congress "hoped to make
plain that § 7 applied not only to mergers between actual com-
petitors, but also to vertical and conglomerate mergers whose effect
may tend to lessen competition in any line of commerce in any
section of the country." 23
This line of reasoning can be applied to a joint venture combi-
nation, the formation of which forecloses any potential competition
between the parent companies and between each parent and the
progeny joint venture. It was this premise that motivated the
Supreme Court to answer affirmatively the query of whether section
7 was applicable to joint ventures.
In applying section 7 to Penn-Olin in the instant case, the
Court did not deem overriding the requirement that both the
acquired and the acquiring company be "engaged in commerce"
17 "The Clayton Act's objective is the same as that of the Sherman Act.
namely, to preserve competition. . . ." VAN CIsE, op. cit. supra note 14,
at 42.
28 "Section 7 . . . is designed to arrest potential restraints in their incip-
ience and requires findings not of actual anti-competitive effects, but merely
of a reasonable probability of a substantial lessening of competition or a
tendency toward monopoly." Note, Joint Ventures and Secton 7 O4 M,
Clayton Act, 14 STAN. L. REV. 777, 789 (1962).
19 S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1950).
202 U.S. CODE CoNG. Smwv. 4295 (1950).
21 Note, supra note 18, at 779.
-38 Stat 730, 732 (1914).
22Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317 (1962).
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when the acquisition is made, since this conclusion might have
precluded the application of section 7. Clearly a joint venture does
not fulfill this seemingly necessary condition as there is no acqui-
sition in the technical sense. Since there is the formation of a new
entity, rather than the acquisition of one already "engaged in
commerce," the Court could not literally apply the statute. This
difficulty was overcome by the declaration that the implications of
the phrase "engaging in commerce" are satisfied by the fact that
the joint venture was engaged in commerce at the time the suit
was instituted. In so holding, the majority relied on the earlier
case of United States v. E. L duPont de Nemours & Co.,24 where-
in it had been held that the competitive effects of an acquisition
were to be tested at the time of trial rather than at the time of
acquisition.23
In giving great weight to the manifest congressional intent
which permeated the 1950 amendment, the Court indicated that
sectiofi 7 was to be broadly applied, stating that "the test of the
section is the effect of the acquisition."2 This liberal interpretation
stemmed from the Court's conviction that to construe section 7 in
any other way "would create a large loophole in a statute designed
to close a loophole." 27
Although the Supreme Court was "ploing new ground," in
that it had never previously considered the question of whether
section 7 was applicable to joint ventures, there is some precedent
to support the majority opinion. In an earlier decision the Court
had concluded that
if concentration is already great, the importance of preventing even slight
increases in concentration and so preserving the possibility of eventual de-
concentration is correspondingly great.28
In addition, "the dominant theme pervading congressional consid-
eration of the 1950 amendments was a fear of what was considered
to be a rising tide of economic concentration in the American
economy." 29 If, in the instant case, the joint venture had not been
dissolved, the sodium chlorate market in the southeastern United
States might have become so highly concentrated that there would
have been little possibility for deconcentration.'
24353 U.S. 586 (1957).
25 Id. at 607.
26 United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
27 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 343 (1963).
28 Id. at 365 n.42.29 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, supra note 23, at 315.50 The sodium chlorate market in the southeastern United States was
composed of four-competitors when this suit was commenced. The possibility
of Penn-Olin's parent corporations' entering this market was then quite
remote, whereas before the joint venture both had been, in the words of Mr.
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The Court also analogized to a previous antitrust case, decided
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act,3 ' wherein it had held that
"arrangements or combinations designed to stifle competition cannot
be immunized by adopting a membership device accomplishing that
purpose." 32 In that case the Government had brought an action
charging Associated Press with monopolistic practices violative of
the Sherman Act. Associated Press was a cooperative association
engaged in the gathering and distributing of news, but the fact that
it was merely a cooperative did not exempt it from the restrictions
of the Sherman Act. Similarly, the Court in the principal case re-
fused to exempt joint ventures from the restrictions of the Clayton
Act.
Since the Penn-Olin case is one of first impression, and since
only some aspects of the problem could be found in prior cases,
the Court's decision to broadly apply Section 7 of the Clayton Act
is based more on policy than on precedent. Although the anti-
monopoly policy of the Court is laudable, the wording of section 7
is almost totally ignored to achieve this admittedly worthwhile end.
The Court itself indicates that its present tendency is to more
liberally interpret the Clayton Act and, perhaps, all anti-monopoly
statutes. By virtue of this judicial attitude, exemplified by the
Court's statement that the "test of the section is the effect of the
acquisition," it appears that all anti-competitive combinations will
be vulnerable to governmental restriction under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act.
Consequently, Penn-Olin will adversely affect the use of joint
ventures. Since this form of enterprise is now, by virtue of this
decision, subject to the strictures of section 7 (whereas formerly
it was subject only to Section 1 of. the Sherman Act) 83 its useful-
ness has diminished. The joint venture had been "a convenient
means for providing great concentration of financial resources,
knowledge and skill... ." Since the Court has applied the same
standards to the joint venture as had been applied to the merger,
Justice Douglas, "on the eve of competitive projects in the southeastern
market. . . ." United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., supra note 26, at
180. (dissenting opinion).
s' Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides:
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal ... " 69 Stat. 282, 15 U.S.C.§ 1 (1958), amending 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
32Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 19 (1945).
s8"It is settled that joint manufacturing ventures, even in domestic
markets, are not made unlawful per se by the Sherman Act, but become
unlawful only if their purpose or their effect is to restrain trade or to
monopolize." United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., 100 F. Supp. 504,
557 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).84 Jaeger, Joint Ventures: Origin, Nature and Development, 9 Am. U.L.
Ray. 1 (1960). (Emphasis added.)
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the joint venture will now be less able to provide large scale in-
dustry with a means to effect the concentration of large amounts
of capital and the concurrent reduction of competition. Since it
might no longer be possible to concentrate capital to the degree
that was hitherto permissible, the joint venture will now be less
able to reduce financial risk and aid in the achievement of economies
of scale.35 And since prior to this decision this type of enterprise
was subject only to the restrictions of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act, the joint venture will now be less able to minimize the risk
of governmental interference with anti-competitive activities. Now,
although different in form and organization, the merger and the
joint venture will be subject to similar control. Hence, a corpor-
ation will undoubtedly prefer to merge with an already established
corporation, rather than to form an entirely new one via a joint
venture.
Moreover, it appears that this decision will have a restrictive
effect upon all types of business combinations regardless of whether
they were formerly subject to section 7. By stating that "the test
of the section is the effect of the acquisition," the Court appears
to be requiring only an anti-competitive potential in order to apply
the restrictions of the Clayton Act. Thus, the Penn-Olin decision
apparently tolls the death knell for any combination that might
restrict competition, irrespective of the organizational attributes of
the enterprise.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES CONTROL ACT
-SECTION 6 HELD INVALID AS INFRINGEMENT OF FIFTH AMNEND-
MENT GUARANTEE OF RIGHT TO TRAVEL. - Appellants' passports
were revoked by the Department of State because it was believed
that their use of the passports would violate Section 6 of the
Subversive Activities Control Act.'
This statute makes it unlawful for a member of any organ-
ization required to register with the Subversive Activities Control
Board to (1) make application for a passport or the renewal
35 Economies of scale are found in industries where technical conditions
may lead to increasing returns to scale, i.e., where output is ex-
panded average costs of production fall. The reasons for this situation are
(1) the advantage of increased specialization, e.g., assembly line tech-
nique, and (2) technical indivisibility of input, e.g., feasibility of making
large scale capital investment only where there is a large scale capacity.
SNIDER, EcoNomIcs, PRINCIPLES AND IssuEs 409-14 (1962).
164 Stat. 993 (1950), as amended, 68 Stat. 778, 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1954).
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